NCAA Transfer & NIL Policies

[80sRamBaseballRugby]

This makes absolutely no sense to me.

First, unless Congress acts, what you call "seizing this opportunity" DOJ calls an antitrust violation.

More significantly, you seem to be projecting a future in which "the universities" run a pro league that can replace the NBA. Why would I want that? The NBA exists now. I am indifferent to it. Replicating it with 352 teams instead of 30 has zero allure.

Some of you old timers will recall that in the dim dark past, VCU played exhibition games against organizations like Athletes in Action. They also played against company teams. For some reason I recall that we played multiple times against Sinclair Oil's traveling squad.

As I remember, no one came to cheer on old Sinclair, because who the heck wants to watch low level basketball employees of a company.

That is where we are headed with "college" teams. A group of yearly contracts with sub-NBA professionals brought in before Thanksgiving who have zero connection to the school or the institution for which they work and will be gone by the time the flowers bloom in spring.

I like senior nights. I like graduating players. I like watching the fuzz-faced kid grow into a man over years of maturation at VCU. I like kids who grow into men like Darius who bleed black and gold.

I have no interest in watching a team staffed entirely of one year rentals who don't go to classes because they don't want a degree and have zero connection to the school. These rentals are marketing employees and nothing more. I have no interest in them.

Others are of course entitled to root on what's his name who was at Longwood last year and ODU the year before and will be at Va Tech next year. Have at it. Maybe I am alone, but I suspect I am not.

The piece your missing is that the “NBA players” wouldnt be in the NBA. They would play for Kansas and Texas A&M and Duke and yes, VCU. They’d be employees. Maybe students too. Maybe not. Unlimited eligibility.

I’m not sure how it would be illegal to start the league of college sports. But I’m no lawyer.

It would probably divide the colleges into pro league schools snd amateur schools.

Bottom line, and my whole point is, we don’t need two pro leagues paying $millions to players. One of the two is doomed to failure.

 

[artRAMinMN]

For now, explicit contractual performance incentives would violate NCAA rules against pay-for-play (unless perhaps there's some kind of extra layer of justification that bases the bonuses on increased name/image/likeness value).

If someone tried to be a guinea pig, and test whether the NCAA would either cave in, or try to enforce (and risk losing as has been the trend), then it could make the NCAA even less powerful. But there is also some risk that public opinion tips and turns against the free for all, and it could lead to there being political will to legislate the NCAA back into the driver's seat... which in turn could raise constitutional challenges back into the courts. Rinse. Repeat.

 

[SteveMM]

But there is also some risk that public opinion tips and turns against the free for all

It's tipping now.

 

[WillWeaverRVA]

 

[N Mollen]

From the article:

Also as part of the terms, plaintiffs will agree to cooperate with the NCAA’s years-long congressional lobbying effort “regarding antitrust exemption,” the document notes. NCAA and conference leaders plan to continue lobbying lawmakers in a post-settlement world. They hope Congress will codify the settlement agreement with legislation to offer a more permanent solution or, at the very least, grant the NCAA protection to enforce its rules and deem athletes as students and not employees.

If Congress does not pass this legislation, the "rules" they propose to implement after the settlement is finalized would be unlawful and they'd be right back in litigation. I can't believe that the settlement would not be contingent on Congressional action

 

[rambunctiousrowdyram]

Riddle me this, if this program we all here love was the one in such a position that it was putting out the kind of checks we're seeing out there, would you as a fan feel any different about the amounts? Be honest.

It feels like hiring a mercenary. They have no connection and will be quickly forgotten. We talk about players fondly remembered like Maynor, Melvin, Jequan, Burgess, Shuler, older VCU legends, etc. It’s over. It probably died around the Ace exit or so. Shulga will be forgotten in a few years.

There is no connection to the players. They don’t understand rivalries. Mainly because you see players essentially joining rivals or near rivals. It’s just painful for the sport tbh.

 

[BaNgMyPrOgRaM]

I said the same thing on another thread and we loved those guys MSS and Tobii when they played here. Not so much anymore. That's a schism.

 

[petie dink]

Seriously???? Once their contract is up, they will no longer be employees. Contracts will be for the duration of their eligibility only. Basic Business 101.

I think a limit on years of competition can be considered a restraint of trade. Business 102

 

[share the ball]

I think a limit on years of competition can be considered a restraint of trade. Business 102

colleges and univeristies exist for the purpose of education of students, research and public service - sports are anciliary to that purpose - they are not a Business or else they would be taxed for federal and state income tax etc and gifts to them would not be charitable deductions etc

evidently you went to University of Richmond for your law degree or was it GMU (LOL)

 

[Ramaholic]

I think a limit on years of competition can be considered a restraint of trade. Business 102

You may want to go back and retake Business 102.

 

[MobileMunchies]

You may want to go back and retake Business 102.

 

[N Mollen]

Seriously???? Once their contract is up, they will no longer be employees. Contracts will be for the duration of their eligibility only. Basic Business 101.

I think you two are talking about 2 different things. One is whether VCU can agree to hire a player for a fixed term and refuse to renew it. That is plainly lawful

The other is whether VCU and DAY and UR can agree that none will hire a player who has played 4 years (or any other term). That would be an agreement in restraint of trade. In this hypothetical, VCU and DAY would be competitors in the labor market, and agreements to limit their competition would not be permissible

That's Antitrust and Competition Law 201.

 

[Wolfpack Ram]

I think you two are talking about 2 different things. One is whether VCU can agree to hire a player for a fixed term and refuse to renew it. That is plainly lawful

The other is whether VCU and DAY and UR can agree that none will hire a player who has played 4 years (or any other term). That would be an agreement in restraint of trade. In this hypothetical, VCU and DAY would be competitors in the labor market, and agreements to limit their competition would not be permissible

That's Antitrust and Competition Law 201.

I think your big assumption is that players/employees would then have unlimited eligibility. That's a big "if". All contracts can be tied to available eligibility being a requirement of employment. That's no different than the typical workforce where positions have minimal requirements in order to be considered for the position. If players are going to be considered "employees" and sign contracts, they are not going to get "special" consideration through HR practices just because they are athletes.

And if they are going to be treated like professional athletes, then contracts will be even more important with fixed terms of the contract where either party can part ways at the end of the contract. Also, you can bet there will be performance standards in each and every contract as part of conditions of employment. It's not like colleges/universities will have to re-invent the HR process for these athletes if it comes to this. There are plenty of legal business models out there to use when structuring contracts and term limits that protect both the employer and the employee.

 

[N Mollen]

I think your big assumption is that players/employees would then have unlimited eligibility. That's a big "if". All contracts can be tied to available eligibility being a requirement of employment. That's no different than the typical workforce where positions have minimal requirements in order to be considered for the position. If players are going to be considered "employees" and sign contracts, they are not going to get "special" consideration through HR practices just because they are athletes.

And if they are going to be treated like professional athletes, then contracts will be even more important with fixed terms of the contract where either party can part ways at the end of the contract. Also, you can bet there will be performance standards in each and every contract as part of conditions of employment. It's not like colleges/universities will have to re-invent the HR process for these athletes if it comes to this. There are plenty of legal business models out there to use when structuring contracts and term limits that protect both the employer and the employee.

I just addressed some of these themes in a different thread, and paste the answer here, complete with mystery strike-throughs. The bottom line is an employer can set up mostly whatever requirements and limitations it wants for its own hiring practices. Agreements among competitors for labor that impose those same restrictions are unlawful.

From the other thread:

Absolutely nothing (least of all the Sherman Act) would prevent a university from setting its own rules. The Sherman Act prevents market competitors from entering into agreements in restraint of trade. VCU could absolutely decide it would not employ someone who has played a sport for four years already, whether at VCU or at another institution, but when VCU and Dayton agree "we won't hire candidates for employment who have played for years already" or won't continue to employ someone who gets a D in physics, that incrementally reduces the opportunities for participants in the labor market, prevents Player A from being employed, and acts as a restraint in the labor market of central concern to the Sherman Act's goals.

If the agreement were only between VCU and Dayton, it would almost certainly survive antitrust scrutiny because together VCU and Dayton represent only a tiny portion of the overall labor market -- they do not have "market power."

But as the S Ct has already observed, "the NCAA enjoys “near complete dominance of, and exercise monopsony power in, the relevant market”—which it defined as the market for “athletic services in men's and women's Division I basketball and FBS football, wherein each class member participates in his or her sport-specific market.”

Thus, if the NCAA (or some successor organization) makes class attendance or minimum grade performance or eligibility limitations applicable to all member institutions, it is effectively saying to excluded employees "you can't work." Whether analyzed as a per se violation or under the Sherman Act's rule of reason, that kind of restriction won't fly.

And the S Ct has said, even before the recent revolution in employee pay and free agency:

We do not doubt that some degree of coordination between competitors within sports leagues can be procompetitive. Without some agreement among rivals—on things like how many players may be on the field or the time allotted for play—the very competitions that consumers value would not be possible. See Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101, 104 S.Ct. 2948 (quoting R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 278 (1978)). Accordingly, even a sports league with market power might see some agreements among its members win antitrust approval in the “ ‘twinkling of an eye.’ ” American Needle, 560 U.S. at 203, 130 S.Ct. 2201.

[But] the NCAA's rules fixing wages for student-athletes [are different]. Nobody questions that Division I basketball and FBS football can proceed (and have proceeded) without the education-related compensation restrictions the district court enjoined; the games go on.

The question here is whether, on balance, refusing to employ people who have been employed elsewhere or who go to class is, on balance, "pro-competitive." That is, would the labor market for employee services be more competitive with the restrictions than without. I cannot conceive of a non-frivolous argument that this would be so.

Long-winded answer to an important question in the wrong thread, but there you go. Thank you for listening to my Ted Talk.

I don't know where the strike through came from; my apologies

 

[Wolfpack Ram]

I think a limit on years of competition can be considered a restraint of trade. Business 102

That will be up to the courts to decide. Currently, eligibility restrictions are in place, and have been for years. Those eligibility restrictions would have to be overturned in court, and then that would open up an entirely new can of worms, which will ultimately destroy college sports - if it isn't already destroyed prior to that point.

Let's also not forget college athletic eligibility is tied to student status. Until student status and college athletics are separated, there will always be eligibility requirements.